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ADDRESSING THE GAP: 
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR 
PEACEKEEPERS ACCUSED OF SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 
Jayden van Leeuwen* 
The United Nations (UN) has been plagued by incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers for a number of years. These tragedies have had major implications for the credibility 
of the organisation and have hindered its ability to achieve its goals. As the organisation has struggled 
to address this problem, a new form of accountability has evolved: direct non-legal accountability. 
This article examines the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, previous 
responses to this problem and the emergence of this new type of accountability. Direct non-legal 
accountability provides a viable alternative to standard conceptions of accountability in response to 
the situation. Although it will not solve the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse, normative 
improvements could be made to these mechanisms in order to better provide some accountability to 
the victims of this exploitation and abuse.   
I INTRODUCTION  
United Nations peacekeepers are often inserted into some of the direst situations on the planet and 
have the difficult task of attempting to maintain peace and order in communities ravaged by war, 
famine, natural disasters and other complex circumstances. Unfortunately, despite peacekeepers 
occupying positions of power and trust in some of the world's most vulnerable communities, the UN 
has been faced with a major crisis for a number of years – peacekeepers sexually exploiting and 
abusing the very people that they have been sent to protect.1  
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1  Paisley Dodds "AP Investigation: UN troops lured kids into Haiti sex ring" Associated Press (online ed, New 
York, 13 April 2017). 
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This ongoing issue has posed a challenge to successive Secretaries-General, and the international 
community as a whole for many years, with numerous mechanisms designed and implemented in an 
attempt to provide accountability for these crimes. Many of these mechanisms can be characterised 
as attempting to force troop-contributing countries to exercise their exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
over their peacekeepers. However, this article will focus on the development of accountability 
mechanisms which provide for the rights and interests of victims, evaluating them against principles 
of accountability and victims' rights more generally, in order to assess these recent mechanisms for 
the accountability of peacekeepers who commit sexual exploitation or abuse. Particular attention will 
be paid to the Secretary-General's 2017 Report on "Special measures for protection from sexual 
exploitation and abuse" (the 2017 Report), and the mechanisms outlined within it.2 Ultimately, there 
is still a critical lack of legal accountability, with mechanisms increasingly focused on providing a 
form of direct non-legal accountability through creating a sense of moral retribution and 
acknowledgement of suffering. In particular, these mechanisms can be seen to provide for the rights 
and interests of victims in a manner consistent with those outlined in the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.3 Although these are positive steps, 
the article will build on this analysis to also engage in discussion as to how this accountability could 
be improved, paying particular attention to initiatives such as victim impact statements and restorative 
justice. This new direct non-legal accountability is not a silver bullet to solve the pervasive issue of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, but it is an important step in providing some form of vindication for 
victims. 
The key contention of this article is that the approach outlined in the Secretary-General's 2017 
Report offers a viable alternative of accountability for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse at the 
hands of UN peacekeepers, and, with alterations, could fill the current gap created by the lack of legal 
accountability. In Part II, this article will outline the scope of the problem of peacekeepers committing 
sexual exploitation and abuse while on missions, before exploring the concept of accountability and 
some of the past solutions that have been proposed and implemented in Part III. While Part IV will 
discuss the new approach to the issue provided in the Secretary-General's 2017 Report, Part V will 
analyse this new approach and discuss potential improvements that could be made in order to provide 
greater accountability to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. 
II PROBLEM  
In order to be able to engage in discussion and analysis of the new approach to the accountability 
of peacekeepers who commit sexual exploitation and abuse while on mission, it is necessary to first 
  
2  Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach – Report of the Secretary 
General UN Doc A/71/818 (28 February 2017). 
3  Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power GA Res 40/34 (1985). 
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identify the scope of the problem. This part of the article thereby outlines the historical and 
contemporary manifestations of the issue. 
A What is Peacekeeping?  
Peacekeeping is a function of the UN which is not explicitly provided for in its Charter, but has 
developed gradually over time.4 Following the identification of a situation where peacekeepers would 
be beneficial, the authorisation for a peacekeeping operation will usually be a Security Council 
resolution, drawing generally on the powers vested in the Council by Chapters VI and VII of the UN 
Charter.5 This is followed by a series of agreements between troop-contributing countries, the host 
country and various branches of the UN, alongside the establishment of the command structure and 
support apparatus for the mission.6 Ideally, the mission will be founded on the consent of the host 
state in order to maximise cooperation and local engagement, but this is not strictly necessary due to 
the binding authority of the Security Council's Chapter VII powers.7 As such, it is entirely possible 
for a mission to face a hostile reception in the host state.  
Peacekeeping missions vary in their size and composition. They can be short-term arrangements 
designed to provide interim stability, or longer running operations more heavily focused on issues 
such as peacebuilding and ceasefire management. Since 1948, there have been 71 peacekeeping 
missions, of which 14 are still active at the time of writing.8 Although the concept of peacekeeping 
has faced criticism for decades over issues such as cost, "mission creep" and measures of tangible 
success, in more recent years the UN has been plagued by the ongoing challenge posed by 
peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse while on missions. 
B Sexual Exploitation and Abuse  
The issue of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions rose to global prominence in 
the early 2000s following allegations of widespread instances of exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers within the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO). Between January 2004 and December 2005, 278 peacekeeping personnel were 
investigated by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for alleged instances of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, with 122 military personnel and 16 police officers repatriated.9 The scandal 
  
4  Shayna Ann Giles "Criminal Prosecution of UN Peacekeepers: When Defenders of Peace Incite Further 
Conflict Through Their Own Misconduct" (2017) 33 Am U Int'l L Rev 147 at 154.  
5  At 154.  
6  At 156.  
7  At 155.  
8  United Nations Peacekeeping "Where We Operate" <https://peacekeeping.un.org>.  
9  Ray Murphy "An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel" 
(2006) 13 Int'l Peacekeeping 531 at 532.  
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was widely reported by international media, and the UN faced immense public scrutiny for the 
widespread nature of the offending throughout the mission.10 Although MONUSCO was not the first 
peacekeeping mission to be marred by allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, 
the scale of the offending meant the situation became a major political issue, unlike incidents that 
were more readily brushed aside such as those in Mozambique, Somalia, East Timor and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the 1990s.11  
Despite a series of inquiries and numerous new initiatives being implemented in the years 
following the MONUSCO scandal, peacekeeping missions have continued to see allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse in recent years. For over four years in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, 
peacekeepers from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) operated sex rings involving 
girls as young as twelve years old.12 These sex rings involved not only the sexual abuse of young 
girls, but also the exploitation of the peacekeepers' positions of authority to manipulate the victims 
into silence.13 Peacekeepers in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) were accused of numerous instances of rape, with the 
allegations being brushed aside by MINUSCA officials and only coming to light following the leaking 
of information by a UN official.14 These are just two examples of what is unfortunately a pervasive 
issue within UN peacekeeping missions.  
According to UN statistics, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers had 
generally been trending downwards since comprehensive data collection began in 2007, with the 
number of allegations falling from 127 in the first year of record keeping to 52 in 2014.15 Despite 
these decreasing statistics, 2015 and 2016 saw the numbers climb again, with 69 and 104 allegations 
respectively.16 Sixty-two allegations were made in 2017, and as at the time of writing, 54 allegations 
were made in 2018, and one allegation had been made in 2019.17 The fluctuation of these numbers 
demonstrates the complex challenge of combating this pervasive problem, with responses to date 
having mixed success. Academics such as Kate Grady question the accuracy of these statistics, 
arguing that it is likely that the statistics do not accurately represent the true scale of the sexual 
  
10  Joseph Loconte "The UN Sex Scandal" The Weekly Standard (online ed, Washington DC, 3 January 2005).  
11  Murphy, above n 9, at 531.  
12  Dodds, above n 1.  
13  Dodds, above n 1.      
14  Sandra Laville "UN troops 'abused at least eight women and girls' in Central African Republic" The Guardian 
(online ed, London, 4 February 2016).  
15  Conduct in UN Field Missions "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse" <https://conduct.unmissions.org>. 
16  "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse", above n 15.  
17  "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse", above n 15. 
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exploitation and abuse that is carried out by peacekeepers.18 Grady reasons that this is likely due to 
the potential under-reporting of incidents because of factors such as fear and intimidation.19 The 
exploitative nature of many of the interactions is itself a potential barrier to reporting due to the misuse 
of positions of trust and authority to manipulate victims into keeping their abuse hidden.  
Regardless of whether these statistics are accurate, they indicate that the UN has a systemic issue. 
Any instance of sexual exploitation or abuse by a peacekeeper undermines the credibility of the UN 
in the very communities it is trying to protect, having untold counterproductive results. At a more 
fundamental level, it is an abhorrent violation of the rights of the victims, and can in no way be 
justified, ignored, or condoned. This is reflected in the UN's "zero tolerance" policy for sexual 
exploitation and abuse by its staff, including peacekeepers. All field personnel on peacekeeping 
missions are given a "no-excuses" card on deployment which outlines the UN's zero tolerance policy, 
meaning there is no issue of a lack of understanding – but despite this, these despicable acts continue 
to occur.20 
III ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM – PAST RESPONSES  
Understanding the past solutions that have been proposed and implemented is crucial in order to 
discuss the new approach to accountability. Part III therefore seeks to survey previous responses to 
the issue and conceptualisations of accountability in order to provide a grounding from which to 
explore the new approach.  
A The Concept of Accountability  
Accountability can be defined in a number of differing ways, depending on who is being held 
accountable, and who that accountability is to. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
accountability is the "fact or condition of being accountable; responsibility".21 In a practical sense, it 
involves the perpetrator being held to account for their actions. Accountability is critically important 
for the UN, especially in relation to its peacekeeping missions. Accountability enhances legitimacy 
and public trust in the organisation and those carrying out its missions, and without this legitimacy it 
is difficult for the goals of a peacekeeping mission to be achieved.22 Where trust is broken in this 
way, the symbol of the UN becomes one of oppression and abuse, not aid and protection. It is therefore 
important that individuals do not believe peacekeepers can act with impunity.  
  
18  Kate Grady "Sex, Statistics, Peacekeepers and Power: UN Data on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the 
Quest for Legal Reform" (2016) 79 MLR 931 at 936–937.  
19  At 936–937.  
20  Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach – Report of the Secretary 
General, above n 2, at 32.  
21  English: Oxford Living Dictionaries "Accountability" <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com>.   
22  Devika Hovell "Due Process in the United Nations" (2016) 110 AJIL 1 at 46–47. 
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Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane characterise accountability into seven different types: 
hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer and public reputational.23 This formula of analysis 
can be used to describe mechanisms applicable to peacekeepers who perpetrate sexual exploitation 
and abuse.  The main types of accountability that these individuals are likely to be subject to are 
hierarchical and legal; hierarchical accountability involves peacekeepers being held to account by 
their superiors within the applicable disciplinary processes, while legal accountability concerns their 
liability for legal consequences.24 However, not all of the mechanisms that the UN has implemented 
fit cleanly within these categories, and can instead be characterised by their apparent effect of 
providing some form of non-legal accountability to the victims themselves, in a moral, cathartic sense 
– the idea of knowing their attacker has faced consequences for their actions, and offering a degree of 
closure. The measures outlined in the Secretary-General's 2017 Report broadly fit within this 
characterisation in that they seek to increase support for victims, acknowledge their suffering and 
provide a sense of moral vindication and closure for the victim.25 
B The Barrier of the Status Quo  
A key element of the UN's response to the issue has been attempting to hold perpetrators 
accountable for their actions, but a major barrier remains in that peacekeepers are under the 
jurisdiction of their troop-contributing country.26 This means that the troop-contributing country 
retains the exclusive ability to prosecute and punish their peacekeepers. At the heart of this 
arrangement is the concept of state sovereignty, and accordingly the troop-contributing country retains 
active personality jurisdiction of its troops at the expense of the host country and the UN.27 This is 
codified in the status of forces agreement (SOFA), which establishes the necessary arrangements for 
peacekeeping missions between the UN and the host country. All peacekeeping missions utilise the 
model SOFA of 1990, cl 47(b) of which states:28 
Military members of the military component of the United Nations peace-keeping operation shall be 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal 
offences which may be committed by them in [the host country].  
  
23  Ruth W Grant and Robert O Keohane "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics" (2005) 99 
APSR 29 at 36.  
24  At 36–37.  
25  Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach – Report of the Secretary 
General, above n 2, at 6–8.  
26  Melanie O'Brien Criminalising Peacekeepers: Modernising National Approaches to Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (UK), 2017) at 33.  
27  At 33.  
28  Model status of forces agreement for peacekeeping operations: Report of the Secretary-General UN Doc 
A/45/594 (9 October 1990) at [47(b)].  
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This arrangement is therefore standard policy and applies to all criminal offences carried out by 
peacekeepers while on a mission, regardless of whether they occurred in the course of their official 
duties. In this sense, peacekeepers have absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of host country 
judicial systems, as opposed to the more standard functional immunity granted to general UN 
employees.29 In line with this default position, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse can still 
be investigated by the OIOS and result in mandatory repatriation of the alleged offender, but any form 
of legal accountability lies with the troop-contributing country.30  
Moreover, this creates a significant barrier to meaningful accountability of peacekeepers who 
perpetrate sexual exploitation and abuse. There is a pervasive and ingrained "boys club" mentality 
within peacekeeping operations which stymies investigations when peacekeepers "close ranks", 
undermining the efforts of UN investigators.31 Because the troop-contributing country retains 
jurisdiction, the most severe outcome of an OIOS investigation is the repatriation of the peacekeeper, 
with the troop-contributing country remaining responsible for any criminal or administrative 
punishment. If a peacekeeper is repatriated, there is still a question as to whether the troop-
contributing country will carry out its own investigation, and if it does, whether there will be any 
serious consequences for the offence. Despite pressure from the UN itself, as well as from civil society 
actors and the public, troop-contributing countries continue to be reluctant to carry out their own 
investigations, or pursue prosecutions against repatriated peacekeepers.32 Most investigations and 
punishments that do occur are usually within the military justice system of the troop-contributing 
country and can result in almost tokenistic accountability; a large number of perpetrators are sentenced 
to administrative or disciplinary measures, with minimal imprisonment or other serious 
punishments.33  
Data compiled by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations reveals that those perpetrators who 
are investigated and prosecuted all too often receive minimal punishment for their crimes. This data 
on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse details the outcomes of troop-contributing country 
investigations. For example: 
  
29  Anthony J Miller "Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations" (2006) 39 Cornell Int'l LJ 71 at 86 and 90.  
30  Elizabeth F Defeis "UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity" (2008) 7 
Wash U Global Stud L Rev 185 at 197.  
31  O'Brien, above n 26, at 8.  
32  Sarah Smith "Accountability and sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations" (2017) 71 Aust J Int'l Aff 
405 at 408.  
33  Marco Odello and Róisín Burke "Between immunity and impunity: peacekeeping and sexual abuses and 
violence" (2016) 20 The International Journal of Human Rights 839 at 839.  
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(a)  a Gabonese peacekeeper was found to have raped a child in 2016 and was sentenced to only 
45 days in prison, while retaining his position in the army;  
(b) a Mauritanian peacekeeper was found to have raped a child in 2017 and although dismissed 
from the army, was only sentenced to 60 days in prison; and  
(c) a Moroccan peacekeeper was found to have committed sexual assault in 2015 and was 
sentenced to only 40 days in prison, while retaining his position in the army.34  
This data also indicates that there is often little distinction between different types of sexual 
exploitation and abuse when it comes to punishment.  
It is also common for peacekeepers who have been found to have carried out offences such as 
these to go through long periods of time in which no punishment is handed down, despite a finding of 
guilt. For example, a sexual assault perpetrated by a peacekeeper from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in 2015 is still pending action, as is a substantiated rape of a child by a Tanzanian 
peacekeeper in 2016.35 This sort of "limbo" contributes to the sense of impunity for these crimes, and 
these instances represent an alarming reality when it comes to the accountability of peacekeepers for 
sexual exploitation and abuse. Because troop-contributing countries retain jurisdiction, there is little 
ability for the UN to take meaningful action, and the response of troop-contributing countries to 
repatriated peacekeepers is often lacklustre, as evidenced above.36 With the SOFA forming a key 
component of all peacekeeping missions, and state consent underlying the existence of those missions, 
the UN has struggled to find methods which create meaningful accountability for those who are 
subjected to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.  
C Attempts to Circumvent the Status of Forces Agreement Issue 
The legal position created by the SOFAs has forced the UN to pursue alternative means through 
which to hold peacekeepers to account due to the limitations on its hierarchical accountability and its 
inability to provide legal accountability. Mechanisms have instead largely fallen within two 
categories: those which seek to force legal accountability, and those which look to provide non-legal 
accountability directly to the victims. Following the widespread abuse in MONUSCO during the early 
2000s, Secretary-General Kofi Annan ordered an inquiry into sexual exploitation and abuse in UN 
peacekeeping missions.37 This report (the Zeid Report) was the first major investigation into the issue, 
and involved a comprehensive review of the UN's response to the MONUSCO allegations. The Zeid 
Report noted the practical barrier to achieving legal accountability posed by the troop-contributing 
country retaining jurisdiction, and recommended strong hierarchical accountability in its place, 
  
34  "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse", above n 15. 
35  "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse", above n 15. 
36  "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse", above n 15.  
37  Miller, above n 29, at 73.  
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alongside the Secretary-General obtaining "formal assurances"38 from troop-contributing countries 
that criminal jurisdiction will be exercised.39 Despite this pressure for accountability, many troop-
contributing countries still neglect to fully exercise their jurisdiction, as evidenced above. 
When it comes to measures which seek to provide direct support to victims and acknowledge their 
suffering, there has been a focus on the provision of financial assistance to aid in recovery. In 2007, 
the General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Associated Personnel, which outlined the 
support victims should receive following allegations, and provided for minimum standards of 
assistance in areas such as medical care, legal services and psychological support.40 In March 2016, 
the Secretary-General established the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse (the Trust Fund), a fund which provides financial support to victims in order to aid their 
recovery, but does not provide compensation.41 Furthermore, the General Assembly agreed in June 
2016 to transfer payments withheld from peacekeepers in instances of substantiated sexual 
exploitation and abuse to the Trust Fund in order to boost its funding.42  
There have also been a number of key mechanisms employed by the UN that have sought to force 
troop-contributing countries to exercise criminal jurisdiction. In his 2016 report on the issue, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon publicly disclosed for the first time the nationalities of those 
peacekeepers accused of sexual exploitation and abuse in the previous year.43 Under Resolution 2272 
the Security Council authorised the Secretary-General to repatriate entire peacekeeping contingents 
from certain member states when there are allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse, and to decline 
further deployment of troops from that country in the future.44 Measures such as these seek to pressure 
troop-contributing countries to investigate allegations and adequately punish perpetrators by publicly 
disclosing the fact that their troops have been alleged to have committed these crimes, and preventing 
the use of troops from that member state in the future because of their failure to hold perpetrators to 
  
38  A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations UN Doc A/59/710 (24 March 2005) at 6. 
39  At 5.   
40  United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel GA Res 62/214 (2008).  
41  Conduct in UN Field Missions "Trust Fund on Victim Assistance" <https://conduct.unmissions.org>.  
42  Cross-cutting issues GA Res 70/286 (2016).  
43  Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse: Report of the Secretary General 
UN Doc A/70/729 (16 February 2016) at 9 and 10.  
44  SC Res 2272 (2016).  
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account.45 Although these measures do not guarantee that there will be any form of legal 
accountability, in theory they do at least increase the likelihood that it will occur. 
Nevertheless, these mechanisms have been criticised for failing to eliminate the problem of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Sarah Smith has criticised the fact that these mechanisms 
result in the perpetrator being removed from the site of their offending, which although prevents future 
exploitation or abuse in a peacekeeping capacity, does little to punish the perpetrator, provide justice 
to the victim, or increase the UN's legitimacy within the harmed community.46 Róisín Burke has 
argued that in order to better ensure the accountability of those accused of sexual exploitation and 
abuse, the Model SOFA should be rewritten in line with the agreement utilised by NATO, which 
essentially provides peacekeepers and soldiers in foreign states functional immunity in relation to 
their duties only, as opposed to absolute immunity, as well as concurrent jurisdiction in cases of 
offending in the course of official duties.47 Others such as Andrew Ladley have instead reasoned that 
the establishment of international individual criminal responsibility or a UN ombudsperson could help 
to ensure that perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse are held to account by shifting 
responsibility for investigation and punishment away from troop-contributing countries.48  
Many of these scholars have focused on the perceived shortcomings of hierarchical accountability 
and the lack of guaranteed legal accountability in instances of sexual exploitation and abuse, with the 
fact that the troop-contributing country retains criminal jurisdiction being at the heart of these 
criticisms. It is however a political reality that is unlikely to change, due to the concerns of troop-
contributing countries around the procedural safeguards and human rights standards present in the 
court systems of some host countries.49 As such, it is instead important to consider the extent to which 
the UN's alternative mechanisms have been able to provide accountability beyond the conventional 
considerations of legal and hierarchical accountability. In particular, the provision of accountability 
to the victims themselves has seemingly become a more central aim of the alternative mechanisms 
suggested by successive Secretaries-General in their annual reports since 2004. This accountability 
has increasingly been concerned with the provision of tangible support and a sense of moral retribution 
  
45  Rembert Boom "Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2272 and Secretary 
General Report on Special Measures for Protection From Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse" (2016) 55 
ILM 756 at 756.  
46  Smith, above n 32, at 406–407.  
47  Roísín Burke "Central African Republic Peacekeeper Sexual Crimes, Institutional Failings: Addressing the 
Accountability Gap" (2016) 14 NZJPIL 97 at 116.  
48  Andrew Ladley "Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil 
Accountability on International Peace Operations" (2005) 1 Politics and Ethics Review 81 at 87–88.  
49  Odello and Burke, above n 33, 846–847.  
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for the victim in the place of conventional accountability through criminal sanctions. In many senses, 
this is the UN doing what it can, with the limited powers it has, within the existing framework. 
IV A NEW AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH?  
Having explored the scope of the problem and previous responses by the UN, this part of the 
article discusses and analyses the new approach to accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse 
by peacekeepers found in the Secretary-General's 2017 Report.  
At the beginning of every year since 2004, the Secretary-General has released a report into sexual 
exploitation and abuse throughout the UN system. Within these reports, allegations from the previous 
calendar year are outlined in detail, new mechanisms to tackle the issue are often introduced and it is 
also commonplace for the effectiveness of existing mechanisms to be discussed. In his first report as 
Secretary General, the 2017 Report, Antonio Guterres outlined what he termed a "new approach" to 
addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and providing for the accountability of 
perpetrators.50 Two major mechanisms recommended in that report were the appointment of a 
Victims' Rights Advocate (VRA), and that member states should authorise the withholding of 
payments if troop-contributing countries fail to carry out or complete investigations in a timely 
manner, with these amounts then transferred to the Trust Fund.51 The VRA is a mechanism that seeks 
to provide direct non-legal accountability to victims, whereas the recommended withholding of 
payments is a measure that seeks to force troop-contributing countries to exercise their criminal 
jurisdiction. Whereas the VRA, as a member of the Secretariat, was appointable by the Secretary-
General himself, the withholding of payments requires the authorisation of the General Assembly. 
However, this has not yet occured, and the recommendation therefore remains exactly that.  
A The Victims' Rights Advocate 
The VRA is a system-wide official with the overarching goal of leading an "integrated, strategic 
response to victim assistance",52 to "strengthen the support that the United Nations gives to victims 
of sexual exploitation and abuse by providing them with adequate protection, appropriate assistance, 
and reliable recourse to justice."53 In order to achieve this, the VRA works with:54 
  
50  Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: a new approach – Report of the Secretary 
General, above n 2, at 1.  
51  At 9–10.  
52  United Nations "Terms of Reference – Victims' Rights Advocate" <www.un.org> at 1.  
53  United Nations "Victims' Rights Advocate" Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse <www.un.org>. 
54  United Nations "Terms of Reference", above n 52, at 1.  
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 … government institutions, civil society, and national legal and human rights organizations to build 
networks of support and to help ensure that the full effect of local laws, including remedies for victims, 
are brought to bear.  
Practically, this goal manifests itself in the provision of advice and support to UN entities, 
engaging with member states and civil society, and communicating with and providing support to 
victims.55 Respected human rights lawyer Jane Connors was appointed as the first VRA on 23 August 
2017, and continues to hold the position today.56 Alongside Ms Connors, field based advocates have 
also been appointed to certain missions with high rates of sexual exploitation and abuse to provide 
support to victims more readily.57 
The VRA is an example of a mechanism which seeks to facilitate the provision of direct non-legal 
accountability to the victim. Although Ms Connors is unable to forcefully pursue the legal 
accountability of the perpetrator, she and her staff are able to provide direct and tangible support to 
victims. In Ms Connors' own words, her role is to:58  
… give a voice to victims … to ensure that there is capacity to collect evidence, so that there can be a 
proper investigation of the events and so that possibly there could be accountability … making sure that 
the process takes into account the rights and entitlements of the victims, to translate the victim into a 
survivor.  
The role seeks to place victims at the centre of the post-abuse process, and to provide for their interests. 
Working alongside victims to acknowledge their suffering, ensuring that they receive the support they 
need and facilitating the investigation of the offending helps to increase the faith of victims and their 
communities in the UN, and therefore enhance the legitimacy of the organisation. Although this is not 
conventional legal accountability, the VRA is a mechanism that can be seen to provide a sense of 
moral vindication for the victim, providing for their interests and cathartically acknowledging that 
some wrong has been done for which support must now be given. This fits more within the form of 
direct accountability to the victims themselves, and although not guaranteeing legal accountability or 
even an investigative process, it still works to provide victims with some degree of closure.  
  
55  At 1–2. 
56  "Victims' Rights Advocate", above n 53.  
57  United Nations "Field Victims' Rights Advocates" Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse <www.un.org>. 
58  United Nations "'This role is to give a voice to the victims', tells Jane Connors" (3 November 2017) YouTube 
<www.youtube.com>.  
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B The Trust Fund Changes 
The Trust Fund seeks to address service gaps in the provision of support and assistance to 
complainants, victims and children born of sexual exploitation and abuse.59 Its primary source of 
funding is contributions from member states, but the buy-in has been relatively minimal; to date, 
contributions have come from only nineteen member states, including Australia, Bhutan, Cyprus, 
India, Japan and Norway.60 As noted above, the Trust Fund now receives payments withheld from 
peacekeepers against whom allegations have been substantiated. Although this may increase the funds 
available for disbursement from the Trust Fund, it is still primarily dependent on voluntary 
contributions.61  
In his 2017 Report, the Secretary-General called on member states to authorise the withholding 
of payments due to peacekeepers accused of sexual exploitation and abuse and to transfer those 
payments to the Trust Fund when troop-contributing countries fail to carry out or complete 
investigations into the allegations in a timely manner.62 This will require the authorisation of the 
General Assembly, but at the time of writing, this has not yet been given. In proposing this mechanism, 
the Secretary-General sought to apply further pressure on troop-contributing countries to exercise 
their exclusive criminal jurisdiction to hold perpetrators legally accountable. This mechanism could 
also help to address the issue of investigations taking excessively long amounts of time, or undue 
delays in the handing down of punishments, by giving rise to repercussions for doing so.  
Mechanisms such as these are not intended to create legal or hierarchical accountability. These 
types of accountability, especially legal, are often lauded as being crucial in order to provide justice 
for the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, and scholars and commentators have therefore 
frequently focused their work on the need for a change to the status quo in order to provide greater 
legal accountability.63 The actions taken by the Secretary-General have been criticised as being 
inadequate, piecemeal gestures that do not create meaningful accountability for victims.64 However, 
to assess these measures solely on the basis of whether a traditional definition of accountability is met 
misses the very point of these mechanisms.  
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The VRA is not designed to provide legal accountability. Ms Connors does not have the power to 
investigate or sanction peacekeepers, so criticising such a mechanism for its failure to provide a type 
of accountability it was never meant to, is counterproductive. Similarly, measures such as transferring 
withheld payments to the Trust Fund do no more than apply pressure on troop-contributing countries 
to investigate allegations; they do not seek to guarantee legal accountability, because that is something 
they fundamentally cannot provide. The foundation of the UN system is ultimately state consent, so 
unless member states decide to reframe the Model SOFA, provide for some form of international 
criminal responsibility, or authorise further action by the Secretariat, the ability of the Secretary-
General to propose measures that fit within the traditional characterisation of accountability will 
continue to be naturally limited. Instead of attempting to hold these measures to a standard they can 
never meet, it is more productive to consider the extent to which they provide a different form of 
accountability – namely to the victims themselves.  
V ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT  
In its analysis of the "new approach", Part V employs The Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power as an analytical tool to interpret the new approach, 
and proposes potential improvements in order to provide greater accountability for victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse. This discussion aims to highlight potential developments that could occur 
without displacing the legal status quo, thereby maintaining state sovereignty while still seeking to 
provide some level of accountability to victims.  
A Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power 
In 1985, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power (the Declaration).65 In the Declaration, the General Assembly outlined 
minimum standards for criminal justice, victims' rights and the adequate provision of assistance after 
crime has occurred.66 Clauses 14–17 outline the support and assistance which victims should receive 
in order to aid their recovery, and calls for the provision of "the necessary material, medical, 
psychological and social assistance" in order to support victims.67 The Declaration also emphasises 
the importance of victims being supported throughout any judicial process: being made aware of their 
rights and informed of the process, as well as the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the disposition 
of their case.68  
  
65  Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, above n 3.   
66  Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, above n 3.  
67  At [14]. 
68  At [6]. 
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Although primarily outlining appropriate minimum standards for domestic criminal justice 
systems and victims' rights mechanisms, the Declaration can be a useful analytical tool through which 
to view the efforts of the Secretary-General to tackle sexual exploitation and abuse. The mechanisms 
outlined in the 2017 Report do not fulfil all of the standards outlined in the Declaration, but they do 
take significant steps in the provision of non-legal accountability to victims by providing for their 
rights and interests in ways similar to those prescribed in the Declaration.  
As outlined above, the VRA offers practical support to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse 
by ensuring that support is provided to aid them in their recovery, both by utilising disbursements 
from the Trust Fund but also through connecting victims with local and national support services.69 
In this sense, the VRA is a mechanism which provides the kind of support described in cls 14–17 of 
the Declaration. In doing so, the VRA offers valuable support to help victims recover from their sexual 
exploitation or abuse, and transform them from a victim to a survivor.  
The work of both the VRA and her team of field-based advocates informs victims of their rights, 
ensures that they are aware of any investigative process that is occurring and actively supports them 
through that process. Not only does this work align with the minimum standards laid down in the 
Declaration, but it also acknowledges the suffering of the victims and allows them to understand the 
process through which they may be proceeding. The suggested changes to the Trust Fund around 
withheld payments aim to force a greater incidence of investigation, which in turn helps create the 
conditions for the VRA to perform this aspect of her role. Regardless of whether an investigative 
process is engaged or not, the VRA is able to provide support and assistance to victims.70 This offers 
a valuable acknowledgement of their suffering: the UN recognises their experience, and although 
technically does not provide compensation, is willing to offer support in their recovery. In and of 
itself, this can be seen as a vindication of the victims' suffering – a form of non-legal moral 
accountability to them directly.  
These mechanisms have increased the accountability of peacekeepers accused of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, but in a non-legal format. Although there are potential benefits arising out of 
a criminal justice process,71 these alternative mechanisms that seek to provide for the rights and 
interests of victims should not be cast aside as ineffectual or pointless. Working within the framework 
that exists due to the political reality of the UN, it is important to consider how these mechanisms 
could be further improved to better provide this kind of non-legal accountability directly to victims. 
Although mechanisms such as the VRA and the proposed Trust Fund changes are important steps to 
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providing some form of accountability to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, there are a 
number of key changes that could be made in order to strengthen these mechanisms and improve their 
effectiveness. It might not be possible to provide any guarantee of legal accountability, but it is 
feasible that the rights and interests of victims could be further provided for. 
B Victim Impact Statements and Attendance at Criminal Trials 
Crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse can leave victims with long lasting emotional and 
psychological conditions alongside physical injuries and trauma. In many instances, the mental trauma 
caused by sexual exploitation and abuse can be the more detrimental form of injury to victims.72 In 
particular, victims often suffer from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, 
panic disorders, and in some cases, suicidal tendencies.73 Although not all victims will necessarily 
suffer these psychological consequences, for those who do, the aftermath continues long after their 
abuse and exploitation. Some survivors have stated that an important part of the healing process can 
be confronting their abuser, having a chance to share their experience and help their abuser to 
understand the damage their actions have caused.74 Critically, these opportunities are about "allowing 
them [victims] to come to terms with their experiences by facing their attacker and confronting 
perpetrators with the damage that they have caused".75  
Often, a victim faces their abuser within a criminal justice process, but this is because it is simply 
the mechanism through which states most frequently deal with sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Although a criminal trial has the potential to result in tangible legal accountability through a sentence, 
the greater cathartic value for survivors often comes from their ability to exert some level of control 
over the process by sharing their experiences, obtaining justice and facing their abuser.76 Moreover, 
the recognition of their suffering and the legitimisation of their need for assistance and support, 
through both confronting their abuser and also sharing their experience, has positive effects, especially 
in relation to reducing survivors' guilt and negative societal responses.77 Not all survivors will want 
to engage in such a process, and in those instances, it is important to recognise the autonomy of these 
individuals. But for those who want to face their abuser and have an opportunity to engage in this kind 
of process, research indicates that doing so has a greater positive outcome in relation to long term 
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psychological and emotional health than avoidance strategies.78 There are risks associated with 
engaging in a criminal justice process, especially in relation to secondary victimisation and negative 
attitudes within the system itself,79 but addressing these concerns is beyond the scope of this article.  
Overall, the opportunity to confront their abuser and receive some form of cathartic closure is a 
form of direct accountability to the victim because there is an element of moral retribution, a chance 
for the victim to look their abuser in the eye and hold them accountable directly to themselves. 
Although not within conventional conceptualisations of accountability such as that of Grant and 
Keohane, this direct accountability supports the victim in their recovery, and helps to provide closure. 
The research outlined above indicates that this form of accountability can be crucial to victims coming 
to terms with their experiences and recovering from the psychological and emotional damage of their 
abuse.   
As some victims have been shown to recover from their abuse in a more positive way by having 
the opportunity to confront their abuser and share their experiences, this is an area that could be 
strengthened within the context of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Under the status 
quo, peacekeepers who have allegations against them substantiated by OIOS investigators are 
frequently repatriated to their troop-contributing country.80 Although this is ultimately the UN 
exercising its powers of hierarchical accountability to their fullest extent, the peacekeeper is removed 
from the community in which they offended. This poses an immediate barrier to victims being able 
to face their abusers.  
In order for victims to be able to confront their abusers, either the perpetrator needs to remain in 
the host country, or the victim needs the opportunity to take part in any proceedings that may occur 
back in the troop-contributing country. Both of these options were explored in the 2017 Report. 
Guterres called on member states to revise the terms of reference of the Trust Fund in order to permit 
direct assistance payments to allow victims to attend criminal justice proceedings in troop-
contributing countries, or to hold onsite court martials in the host country in order to allow victims to 
attend the proceedings.81 In the event that neither of these are possible, the Secretary-General 
alternatively requested that member states livestream any proceedings so that victims can witness the 
process.82  
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These kinds of changes would increase the opportunity for victims to experience the cathartic non-
legal accountability that is outlined above. If victims had the opportunity to attend the trial of the 
peacekeeper who perpetrated the abuse, they would be able to face their abuser and confront them 
with the reality of their offending. Whether this occurs in the host country at an onsite court martial, 
or in the troop-contributing country as a result of a disbursement from the Trust Fund is largely 
irrelevant – the potential positive effect is still the same. Beyond the potential benefits of allowing 
victims to attend and participate in a trial, onsite courts martial would also improve access to evidence, 
as well as increasing transparency and legitimacy more generally, by allowing communities where 
abuse has occurred to see first-hand some form of accountability process being followed.83 The live 
streaming of proceedings may not provide victims with the same level of participation in the process 
or opportunity to face their abuser as attendance at a trial might provide, but it ultimately still allows 
the victim to see their abuser being subjected to some form of accountability process. This would 
ultimately be an improvement on the status quo, where alleged perpetrators are removed from the host 
country and the victim is potentially left guessing as to the outcome of the allegation.  
These changes ultimately rely on the consent of member states, and there is little indication to 
suggest that this will occur. The reframing of the Trust Fund's disbursement criteria would require 
General Assembly approval, and the Secretary-General is unable to force member states to hold onsite 
courts martial, or to provide for the live streaming of proceedings. The Zeid Report made a 
recommendation for the use of onsite courts martial in 2005, but there has been limited action by 
troop-contributing countries to hold such proceedings since that recommendation was made.84 
Although some states have opted to carry out onsite courts martial, these are often rushed and do not 
provide adequate access for victims or UN officials; for example, at a Pakistani onsite court martial 
in Haiti in 2012, no external observers were permitted to attend the hearing.85  
Even if victims cannot attend trials themselves, encouraging troop-contributing countries to 
mandate the incorporation of victim impact statements into proceedings could be a small improvement 
that would provide some level of direct accountability to victims. Although active participation in any 
proceedings is linked to greater positive impacts in terms of recovery, written victim impact 
statements still provide a valuable opportunity for victims to express their experiences to their 
abuser.86 If troop-contributing countries are unwilling to hold onsite courts martial, and member states 
refuse to reframe the Trust Fund to provide victims with funding to attend trials, victim impact 
statements are a possible alternative. Victim impact statements can serve as a vehicle of 
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empowerment, offering victims a chance to have their voices heard even if they cannot actively 
participate in the proceedings themselves.87 If the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated 
by peacekeepers were able to prepare victim impact statements that were then presented at trial, there 
would be a degree of direct accountability to the victim – although the victim may not have the 
opportunity to look their abuser in the eye, they would still be able to share their experience and, at 
least in theory, make their abuser aware of the effects of their offending. This would enhance direct 
accountability to the victim and aid in their recovery from the abuse by providing a "therapeutic 
experience … [with] cathartic effect".88 As the UN is subject to budgetary constraints and member 
states may be apprehensive to bear the costs associated with onsite courts martial or funding victims' 
attendance at trials, providing for victim impact statements is a cost-effective alternative that still 
recognises the rights of victims and creates greater direct accountability to them. 
C The Victims' Rights Advocate and Restorative Justice 
The role of the VRA could be expanded to further encourage adherence to minimum standards 
and procedural safeguards to ensure timely and genuine proceedings when they do occur. Not only 
do criminal justice proceedings occur far from the site of the offending, but troop-contributing 
countries have complete control over their processes.  A key part of the VRA's role is engaging with 
member states, including on the progress of proceedings.89 Assessing whether proceedings have 
adequately catered for the rights and interests of victims could be a way to encourage troop-
contributing countries to incorporate mechanisms such as victim impact statements. When coupled 
with the proposed changes to withhold payments in instances when troop-contributing countries fail 
to complete or carry out investigations in a timely manner, this expanded role for the VRA and her 
team of field-based advocates would likely encourage troop-contributing countries to cater for the 
rights of victims. Ensuring that perpetrators are not simply rushed through proceedings designed to 
discharge the expectation on troop-contributing countries to investigate is important if victims are 
going to be incorporated more meaningfully into the accountability process.  
Restorative justice processes are becoming more common responses in some countries to 
incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse.90 The nuanced benefits and potential shortcomings of 
restorative justice are beyond the scope of this article, but it is possible that the use of some form of 
restorative justice could better cater for the rights and interests of victims and provide them with 
increased direct non-legal accountability. The potential value of restorative justice processes lies in 
the opportunity for victims to confront their abuser, participate in the process, share their experiences 
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and have the abuser accept responsibility in a controlled environment which minimises the potential 
for further victimisation.91 Most restorative justice processes place the victim at the centre of the 
process, and involve mediated dialogue between the abuser and their victim.92  
Although conventional restorative justice processes seen in Western countries may not be directly 
applicable to instances of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, incorporating elements of 
restorative justice into the mechanisms which address these offences could be useful. Many of the 
opportunities for victims to confront their abusers outlined above rely on the troop-contributing 
country carrying out some form of trial or judicial process which a victim could participate in, through 
mechanisms such as victim impact statements. However, restorative justice processes would not 
require there to have been any exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the troop-contributing country, or 
an international judicial body. If following an OIOS investigation that substantiated any allegations 
against a peacekeeper the VRA was able to facilitate a restorative justice process, willing victims 
would have the opportunity to receive some level of the non-legal accountability that comes with 
confronting their abuser. Moreover, a controlled and mediated restorative justice process could also 
help to reduce some of the risks to the victim's well-being caused by pursuing legal accountability.  
This may be an unconventional option, but in light of the current arrangement in relation to 
criminal jurisdiction such a mechanism may be best placed to increase direct accountability to victims 
through moral retribution and a sense of personal justice that is difficult to acquire through a trial in a 
foreign judicial system. Troop-contributing countries would not be required to give up their exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction, peacekeepers would not suddenly be liable for conviction before a foreign body 
and because the process would not be a legal one carried out by the host country, concerns around 
minimum standards should not be as prevalent. The VRA and her team of field-based advocates would 
be well placed to facilitate such a process and the mechanism itself would be relatively low cost, with 
a potentially high benefit for the victims involved. Providing this forum could also allow for the 
affected community's trust to be restored in the UN, which would have additional ongoing positive 
effects.   
D Further Changes to the Trust Fund 
The Trust Fund is specifically framed to provide assistance and support for victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, but not compensation.93 If the Trust Fund was reframed to allow for 
compensatory payments out of its funds, direct accountability to the victim themselves would be 
greatly enhanced. Compensation is a clear acknowledgment that harm has been suffered, and that 
there should be some remedy for that fact. For victims, compensation is formal recognition, often by 
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a "person in a position of power" that they are owed justice for what has happened to them, and the 
granting of compensation can therefore have a therapeutic effect.94 Practically, the service gaps filled 
by the Trust Fund are the very services that victims could use compensatory payments to cover 
regardless, provided that they were available in their community. In this sense, compensation itself 
would offer a largely therapeutic benefit, and not necessarily any great practical difference to the 
services already offered. Adequate safeguards could be put in place to prevent compensatory 
payments from being used irresponsibly or taken advantage of, while still allowing for the exercise of 
individual autonomy by the victim – something that was infringed through their abuse and 
exploitation.  
Because the Trust Fund includes payments that have been withheld in substantiated instances of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, compensatory disbursements could provide an increased sense of direct 
non-legal accountability for victims because their abusers have contributed to the formal 
acknowledgement of their suffering. This could give a tangible sense of retribution and consequences 
having been suffered directly to the victim. Compensation is one of the minimum standards outlined 
in the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. In it, 
member states are encouraged to first ensure compensation is available from the offender, and in cases 
when it is not, provide financial compensation themselves for "victims who have sustained significant 
bodily injury or impairment of physical or mental health as a result of serious crimes".95 This aspect 
is clearly missing from the UN's response to incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse at present. In 
order to fulfil this standard which is expected of member states, the UN should be able to use the Trust 
Fund to provide direct accountability to victims in the form of compensatory payments.  
VI CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, until individual member states decide to take action to tackle sexual exploitation and 
abuse by UN peacekeepers, the unfortunate reality is that these abhorrent offences are likely to 
continue. Secretaries-General can issue as many reports and make as many recommendations as they 
want, but the fact remains that under the SOFAs troop-contributing countries retain exclusive 
jurisdiction over their troops. This poses a significant barrier to legal accountability, and moreover, 
the hierarchical accountability which the UN can exercise only extends so far.  Many of the 
mechanisms that have been implemented in recent years have been focused on attempting to force 
troop-contributing countries to investigate allegations and hold perpetrators to account, such as the 
withholding of payments in substantiated allegations and the transfer of these to the Trust Fund. 
Additionally, there has been an increasing trend in recent reports by Secretaries-General for measures 
to instead be framed towards providing for the rights and interests of victims. In this sense, a different 
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form of accountability can be achieved – non-legal accountability, directly to the victim themselves. 
Although mechanisms such as the VRA have been a positive step towards this, there are a number of 
further improvements that could be made, such as the attendance of victims at trials, the incorporation 
of victim rights statements, the introduction of restorative justice mechanisms and the granting of 
compensation from the Trust Fund. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are not the solution to the 
problem of sexual exploitation and abuse being committed by peacekeepers. Instead, they focus on 
holding those who do commit these crimes to account after the fact. Ultimately, these mechanisms 
are the UN doing as much as it can in the political reality in which it operates. Every mechanism 
which provides some form of accountability to innocent civilians who have suffered at the hands of 
those who were meant to be protecting them is beneficial.  
